ANTE ROMAC RIMSKO PRAVO PDF
Study: Law – 5. semester. Code: ECTS: Course coordinators: prof. dr. sc. Marko Petrak prof. dr. sc. Ivana Jaramaz-Reskušić izv. prof. dr. sc. Tomislav. 4 јан. ˛˕ˑ ːˈˏ˃ˎˈ ˒ˑ˔ˈ˄ː˃ ˅ˑјːˋ˚ˍ˃ ˖ːˋ˗ˑ˓ˏ˃, ˅ˋˇˋ Ante Romac. Rimsko pravo,ȋΒagЕeb:BibliВЗekaИdžbeБiciiЖkЕiГЗa,). himself) – see Marijan HORVAT: Rimsko pravo, Zagreb, , p. 33 – 36, James E. , p. , Ante ROMAC: Rimsko pravo, Zagreb, , p. , Antun.
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Published on Jan View Download 8. Ajte, President of MPF, The views of the authors do not reflect the views of the Macedonian Political Science Forum. Since our beginnings inwe have created a successful organisation which analyses key aspects of daily events through the prism of political science. We have dedicated the past 18 years to ants promotion of the political science in Republic of Macedonia through various activities.
Among our most successful projects are the two International Academic Conferences, which presented a platform for many eminent national and international experts to discuss current politics and positively influence the development of the political thought on a larger scale. The forth volume of the e-Proceeding of papers encompasses scientific papers from remarkable national and foreign experts, elaborating many key questions of importance to political science.
This Journal pravi to the affirmation of the Macedonian Political Science Forum as an organization which aims to serve as a key factor in the development of the political science in Republic of Macedonia and abroad, as a member of the World electronic library EBSCO. This fact today helps some people to demonstrate the theory of power, or the realistic theory which is dominant doctrine in the international relations. For better understanding of the political realism, we should not forget the Schopenhauer position that philosophers are creators of the most important thoughts, and scientist just walk and paraphrase what philosophers said.
Myth and Praov, World Politics, Vol. Greece and Macedonia, Matica Makedonska, Skopje.
Romac, Ante [WorldCat Identities]
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ius cogens. The Balkan states made permanent efforts for ri,sko “true” representation of “The Macedonian Question” in front of the European public. For this purpose were placed, and often invented, various historical, ethnographic, linguistic, cultural, eligi ad he cieia b hich bee ve” he Geek, Bulgarian or the Serbian character of Ottoman Macedonia.
Thus, the major competing national doctrines in the mutual outsmarting created certain advantages or disadvantages in the use of their own comparative propagandistic methods, language, awareness, education, financial impact and history.
The biggest problem for these contenders was absence of its own dominant ethnic group in the territories that had aspirations. On the other hand, Ottoman millet system did not enable the rapid development of the modern nations in later ottoman society.
Ottoman empire, Greece, ottoman Macedonia, Megali idea.
Greek foreign policy, Ahe. Gardikas Katsiadakis, Greece and the Balkan imbroglio Greek foreign policy, Athens, Aed ggle, propaganda and hellenization in Macedonia and ThraceJournal of Modern Greek Studies, volume 31, number 1, may The issue of control of the constitutionality and legality by the constitutional courts is especially important, not so much from the aspect of the need and the purposefulness of the existence of adequate mechanism of relations between the separate branches of the state authorities, but from the aspect of the relation of the entity havig he aibe gaa f he Cii ih he legislation body.
Although the institute for control of the constitutionality by courts is related to the countries establishing the principle of separation of powers, the issue of the mutual relation of this institute with the principles of organisation of powers is brought up again after the breakup of the socialist countries The issue of control of the constitutionality and legality by the constitutional courts is especially important, not so much from the aspect of the need and the purposefulness of the existence of adequate mechanism of relations between the separate branches of the state authorities, but from the aspect of the relation of the entity having the aibe gaa f he Cii with the legislation body.
The Principle of Separation of Powers and Control of the Constitutionality of Laws The institute for control of the constitutionality was first established in the countries whose systems are based on the principle of separation of powers.
This principle is the leading organisational and structural principle of the legal state. Stojanovikj emphasizes the importance of this principle insisting f i be cideed a baic idea, geeal bjecivi ad The theory of the Constitutional Law notes that before the fall of the communism there were only two constitutional courts in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Although estimations indicate to the fact that they do not represent ostensible institutions, their constitutional position is not constructed so as to provide and practice strong constitutional control of laws.
Today almost all these countries introduce provisions in their constitutions by which the control of the constitutionality of the laws is awarded to the constitutional courts. The principle of separation of powers which actually means that the legislative, executive and judicial power must be separated, is in service of another higher idea, i. In the sources of the constitutional law, the principle that prohibits direct or indirect concentration of competencies in one entity is simultaneously used as an argument of both the supporters and critics of the institute for control of constitutionality.
Namely, if we take into account that the constitutional courts have clear constitutional position in the system of organisation of powers, which precisely separates them from the regular judiciary system, it seems that there is no disruption of the mentioned principle. On the other hand, driven by the fact that the constitutional courts are not real law creators and does not provide for the new rules of behaviour in a manner done by the legislator, it can be established that this model of control of constitutionality removed the danger of direct intervention of the courts in the legislation area.
All of the abovementioned refutes the arguments of the authors who, referring to the principle of separation of powers, criticise the control of the constitutionality by the constitutional courts.
Thus, the frequently emphasized view by Schmitt that the mentioned principle implies restraint of the judicial power of any interference in the work of the legislator, is relativised with In the context of the abovementioned, there are also the claims that constitutional courts competent to perform cassation of laws have their own grounds and justification in the principle of separation of powers, disabling the horizontal concentration of powers.
However, as Kelsen insists, the principle of separation of powers should not be given precedence to, since it is experiencing some kind of evolution in the modern state.
Roman Private Law – practice
It seems that the principle of separation of powers modelled according to the ideas of Locke and Montesquieu was not immune to the modern trends of the constitutionalism. The feeling that the principle lost part of the romantic and authentic becomes stronger.
It seems that the trends of equipoise of the executive power according to the will of the citizens transposed into the legislator are more and more ieed ad he ciial c. The fea f new seaai f wes which provided a possibility for secure positioning of the courts in the process of policy creation is more justifiable today. Ulike he Kele Eea del f cl f he constitutionality, the USA model of control of constitutionality faced the dilemma of his relation with the principle of separation of power at the very beginning The American constitutionalists, especially contemporaries, still try to find most adequate modus by which they will justify the See Judicial review unmasked.
Finally, the conclusions of Leonard W. Levy he ie f a hee eal ad igial iei f introduction of control of constitutionality, as well as whether the c hld have ahiai iee ichiev phrases of the Constitution, which ill el i jdicial eac, jdicial lic-akig, jdicial legilai, today makes the literature of the Supreme Court of the United Sae eflec he icile f agig bll.
Bickel “he f he ai aji ble” baed ail hei ha caed all ae bache, jdicia i he eake bach, represents just another try to justify the Judicial Review, History,And Democracy: Not only the executive power has the honour, but also it holds the sword of the community. Not only the legislator has the financial power, but also it provides for the rules regulating the rights and obligations of the citizens.
Contrary to them the judiciary does not have an influence neither to the sword neither to the financial power, thus it cannot influence the strength nor the wealth of the community.
The emphasis of the political function of the Supreme Court of United States has ceal ii i Bickel he f jdicial veillace he work of the other functions of the state authorities. The possibility for constitutional revision performed by this body provides for the court to act in anti-aji ae, h akig i devia institution of the system.
By establishing the unconstitutionality of the laws and other acts of the legislative and executive power, the See C e he ill f he ciie eeeaive a given historical moment, which at the worst means that it acts not in the name of the majority, but against its will. However, its he f ai-aji ble fid jification in the argument that the court has the authorisation to act as promoter and guardian of the permanent system values. While the legislative and executive power are interested in preserving those vale, ad he fc f hei iee i he iediate benefit”, the court has greater responsibility since it acts on long-term basis.
He looks for the exit from the majority problem, f hich i adi ha i i accdace ih he hea f he decac i he eci f he eae vale or as he has concluded “good society is not only the society which wants to meet the direct need of the majority, but the society which insists to be a foundation of the permanent general values and their ealiai Thus, he admits that the role of the court, even when its decisions have not been in accordance with the will of the majority, is to protect the rights and the interests of the individual which finally represents a permanent system value.
Federalist papers no 78 Alexander Hamilton. However, all of the abovementioned does not solve the dilemma and the tension for the relation of the court with the other branches.
In the context of this conflict, Bickel emphasized that the solution should be looked in the “passive virtues” of the court and the need for the self-restrain from the decision making without previous estimation of the concrete situation and all circumstances related to the case.
As a variation of the self-restrain doctrine, the passive virtue, essentially means restrain from the decision making snte situations when the court estimates that the rimsok conditions are not yet appropriate for its deed. Kronman ill e ha he ia elee f he Bickel hilh ad he ke f understanding of the entire his nate is his faith in the value of the hghfle ad caefle a liical ad jdicial vie Although frequently criticized, and on the basis that it cannot be expected for the court to be asked to intervene only when its product is socially desirable, and especially due to the fear of the aeaace f he cial ieiali, i eomac ha he Bickel theory mobilized the academic community in USA to focus its study on the so-called he ew seaai f wes.
It seems that the American authors are not concerned by the constantly present views on the incompatibility of the control of the constitutionality with the principle of separation of powers, praavo modelled according to Locke and Montesquieu in the same manner as the possibility for appearance of the “new eaai f e”. Faculty Scholarship Series, paper Namely, the historical facts ha USA had eid he he eake bach i he e f power simultaneously represents strongest court recorded in history will motivate the academic community to promote the modes and mechanisms for this condition to be avoided.
This de ahlg f he e ad eff f i avidace will become “academic obsession” of the 20th century in a certain manner. The new separation of powers, as rrimsko situation in the relations between the branches of the state power, essentially means a situation in which courts determine or redefine the action limits of other state branches on the behalf of the constitutional principles.
Thus, Ackerman acknowledges that the system cannot be imagined without an institution which will perform a control of the constitutionality because its absence ld geeae cici rimssko a he hgh f he ciie providing the directions of action to their representatives, and then eecig f he eeeaive ealie he However, he will peavo that the creation of such institution is not a simple task and that it is determined ppravo cumulated sociological, historical and legal factors on one side, and the capability of the constitutor and the general constitutional engineering on the other side The dilemma which was put by A.
Bickel in the 60th of the last century and which is znte on the hei ha he he See C declae he la he ac f the selected executive as unconstitutional, it prevents the will of he ciie eeeaive ad ef a cl i he ae f anre aji, b agai i, inspired Ackerman to try to break the vicious circle prao the so-called constitutional dualism. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch p.
According to him, the control by the court is not an undemocratic phenomenon, as many will explain it, but an institute which will gad he iee f he ciie a fa a We the people ae reengaged in the constitutional policy.
Driven by the abovementioned, we establish that the American constitutional and legal he, aig f The Fedealis Paes to the works of Bickel and Ackerman, still faces the bitterness from the feeling that there is something radically wrong in the control of the constitutionality by the constitutional courts and that it violates the theory of separation of powers. This hei ill ickle he Aeica legal dcie, alhgh he bai of the principle of separation of powers in terms of its justification and complete compatibility with the control of the constitutionality by the constitutional courts is present even in the k f he fdig fahe.
The Principle of Unity of Powers and Control of the Constitutionality of Laws The in compatibility of the principle of separation of powers with the institute of control of the constitutionality is brought out as an argument by both the supporters and its opponents.
That is not the case with the principle of unity of power. Regarding the issue whether the constitutional judiciary can exist in the system of democratic unity of powers, the constitutional and legal theory, especially the one of the former socialist countries follows the opinion that the constitutional judiciary is completely incompatible with it, thereby the control of the constitutionality of the laws as well.
Namely, according to Mijanovikj, “it is stated that without special scientific foundation, the state system based on the principle of unity of powers does not tolerate the control of the constitutionality by the constitutional courts since it would endanger the power of the parliament and provide potential possibility for courtocracy. Sch adeae gadai a be ee f he ic attitude of Stefanovikj according to which there is complete incompatibility of the nature of the judicial function with the control of the constitutionality of laws adopted by the legislative body through the moderate attitude of Gjorgjevikj according to hich he prav f e i l a aial icile ad presumption for preventing the executive power to estrange from the people and its representatives and becoming independent and Kontrola ustavnosti zakona.
Thus, the judicial function consists of removing the infringement done with the general provisions Ustavno pravo. Considered from another perspective, the principle of democratic unity of power is not opposed to the control of the constitutionality by the constitutional court. The following arguments are in favour of this view: The constitutional court is an instrument for protection of the constitution and constitutional system in their entirety, thus the principle of unity of powers as well; The constitutional court does not perform evaluation of the purposefulness of the laws by control of their constitutionality; By deciding on the constitutionality of laws, the constitutional court does not transform itself into a body which creates laws i.
Therefore, it is not mistake if it is established that a priori views on the principle of unity or separation of powerstheir simplification and exaggeration in their relation with the institute of control of the constitutionality does not decrease the value of this institute. This is confirmed by the fact that the control of the constitutionality of laws, is accepted in the systems based on the principle of separation and the systems based on the principle of unity of power by the diversification of the forms through which it is realised.
Thus, the constitutional judiciary does not decrease the authority of the legislator. It is decreased by the violation of the constitution by adopting non-constitutional laws, not by annulling those lows. For more details see. Namely, this sui generis model eee eal laba” f echai, li ad instruments by which the control of the constitutionality is ealied.
The most adequate witness for this success of this model is its durability and extremely rare interventions for its improvement Created in the interspace of the American and classical European model of control of constitutionality, it enables successful and non tendentious combination of the control of the constitutionality by the parliament and the constitutional court, preventive and repressive control of the constitutionality, as well as centralised and decentralised diffused forms of control of the The constitutional revision and the provision intend to decrease the scope of work of the Federal Court at the expense of newly formed federal criminal and constitutional court.
Thus, the Federal court appears as appeal body deciding on the complaints for the decisions of the abovementioned courts. A Constitutional Assesment and Management Mechanisms. Alhgh he le of the Assembly in the control of the constitutionality is significantly reduced, today this body is still competent to perform preventive control of the constitutionality of the cantonal constitutions and to decide on conflict of competencies of the central authority bodies.
The Federal Council is competent for disputes referring to the free arming of the army, religious neutrality in primary school and the guarantee for decent funeral.